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Modern global challenges and geopolitical tensions have forced states and regions to “re-calibrate” their growth patterns and security policies. We suggest for our readers a digest of recent trends based on the EU (by researchers form Bruegel) and the US government’s strategies in drafting modernised approaches to internal and external developmental resilience.
Background
Since the EU’s first European economic security strategy in 2023, the new internal and external risks appeared to force the EU institutions in re-assessing (or, in moder jargon, “re-calibrate”) the EU-wide political economy directions and general strategies. Initially the EU could rely on close cooperation with the United States, the approach that was part of a coordinated transatlantic response to de-risk China’s economic dependence in several manufacturing sectors, particularly in the processing of critical raw materials,
The current geopolitical context implies that the EU needs another type of relationships with China and the US, while facing -at the same time- “major hard-security threat from Russia”. This contemporary challenge forces the EU leaders to develop broad alliances with countries that wish to maintain a rule-based cooperation. Theoretically, the practice of coercion is to pursue one side to actions through using force and/or threats; however, most EU issues/problems cannot be solved by any form of coercion – only by cooperation and agreements. Hence, the EU has to “distance” from Russian resources, and reduce dependencies on China and the US “while maintaining a maximum of mutually beneficial economic engagement”. The extensive nature of dependencies implies the need for medium-term de-risking strategies, combined cooperation; at the same time, the EU must also be ready to respond to threats of coercion.
Von der Leyen, U. (2024). “Europe’s Choice -Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029”. In: https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683-f63ffb2cf648_en
Modern EU member states’ “resilient economic security measures” are preventive and long-term: i.e. they are both aimed at limiting risk of geopolitical tensions and safeguarding economic interests. In most instances economic security, essentially, is not about responding to security threats; generally, it is about forming institutional mechanisms in economics that would allow for the evaluation of trade-offs. For example, trade-restrictive economic security measures need to be balanced against the economic benefits dealing with other essential EU objectives and political priorities, such as the green transition, reinforcement of the single market, support for research and innovation, as well as external free-trade agreements with developing countries. The EU “must combine a medium-term strategy to reduce dependencies on both China and the US in critical areas with the capacity to react in the short term to threats of coercion”; the approach requires the supply chain re-assessments, as identified by Commission research group.
See “joint communication” on “Strengthening EU economic security” (December 2025) in:
https://circabc.europa.eu/ui/group/7fc51410-46a1-4871-8979-20cce8df0896/library/777b1ecb-e7ce-4774-a92c-53f81e64ce76/details?open=true
Besides, the EU needs also a political discussion with the member states on “the circumstances in which the EU Anti-Coercion Instrument should be deployed, and the appropriate measures to respond to coercion envisioned, notes Bruegel.
https://www.bruegel.org/policy-brief/strategy-doctrine-next-steps-european-economic-security
Modern threats to EU economic security
According to the famous European think tank Bruegel, which specialises in economics, there are the following aspects in the EU’s security:
= Restricting import and industrial dependency. Over-reliance on crucial imports is a clear risk to the EU economy, notes Bruegel: “the ability of the EU states to restrict access to these imports strengthens their coercive power”; moves by both the US and China to restrict certain exports of chips and raw materials show this risk must be taken seriously. A particular challenge is that a de-risking strategy for sectors such as the processing of critical raw materials requires close coordination among like-minded countries and substantial investment before dependency can be reduced significantly. An effective strategy to develop alternative sources of supply for critical raw materials, suggests Bruegel, would have to be structural in scope and implemented over the medium to long term.
More in: https://www.bruegel.org/bruegel-european-think-tank-specialises-economics
In industrial aspects, the introduction of the EU’s Clean Industrial Deal (February 2025) and the concept “buy European” and/or “minimum European content” (the latter means that only products with a certain level of European content will benefit from access to government procurement or other benefits, such as consumption subsidies) is expected to help. However, notes Commission, such policies would be incompatible with the EU’s international obligations and could also become a major obstacle to developing partnerships as part of the economic security strategy.
More in: European Commission (2025). “The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation”. COM 85 final, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025DC0085.
Moreover, the introduction of such coercive measures would not necessary “de-risk” import from China (as it is not a member of the World Trade Organization Government Procurement Agreement) and ‘resilience’ criteria will often be sufficient for de-risking purposes outside of government procurement. A ‘Buy Europe’ policy could be a major obstacle to partnerships with likeminded countries and for the diversification of supply chains.
Reference to: European Commission (2023). “European Economic Security Strategy”. JOIN (2023) 20 final, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52023JC0020.
European Commission (2023). “Commission Recommendation on critical technology areas for the EU’s economic security for further risk assessment with the member states”. C(2023) 6689 final, available at https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/31c246f2-f0ab-4cdf-a338-b00dc16abd36_en
= Export vulnerabilities. Some researchers acknowledge that China sought to apply economic coercion to the EU through restrictions on imports to its market: e.g. Chinese attempts to sway member-state decisions on the imposition of countervailing duties on Chinese electric vehicles included threats to limit access to the Chinese market for Spanish pork and French cognac. While such limitations are not macroeconomically significant, they have the potential to shape political outcomes. Although, the Chinese threats did not prevent the EU’s adoption of countervailing duties on electric vehicles; these types of threats might be more successful in areas in which the EU can only act on the basis of a positive qualified majority.
More in: European Commission (2024). “Proposal for a regulation on the screening of foreign investments in the Union”. COM 23 final, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52024PC0023. As well as European Commission (2024). “White Paper on Export Controls”. COM 25 final, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52024DC0025.
= Basic innovative technologies. The area of the so-called foundational and/or emerging technologies presents the strongest case for active industrial policies in the EU’s economic security domain: i.e. these are technologies with the potential to significantly disrupt and reshape the national and global development patterns. A strong presence in the development of such technologies will help ensure the EU’s future strategic indispensability. Besides, the EU would be better equipped to hit back at the coercive measures of others and by doing so would change the decision-making calculus of would-be adversaries.
More in the following links: 1. European Commission (2024). “White Paper on options for enhancing support for research and development involving technologies with dual-use potential”. COM 27 final, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52024DC0027.
2. European Commission (2024). “Proposal for a Council Recommendation on enhancing research security”. COM 26 final, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52024DC0026
= Financial and digital dependencies. Given US dominance in finance, there may be a risk of US financial coercion, not only trade coercion. This was a feature of the first Trump administration when, for instance, pressure was put on HSBC over its interactions with Huawei, and on Swift to disconnect Iranian banks. Given the US desire to maintain the dominant role of the dollar and trust in its financial system, it is unclear exactly how far coercion in this sector could go. However, the record of the first Trump administration and the actions of the second to date imply that this risk should be taken seriously. This is especially important given that finance did not feature in the European economic security strategy and, therefore, preparations in this area may justify a specific new risk assessment.
In order to strengthen the digital resilience of financial entities, the EU adopted the Digital Operational Resilience Act, DORA (it entered into force in January 2025) to ensure that banks, insurance companies, investment firms and other financial entities can withstand and recover from the ICTs disruptions, such as cyberattacks and/or system failures.
More in: https://www.integrin.dk/2024/05/23/digital-operational-resilience-act-dora-strengthening-european-financial-security/
The EU also relies on US digital services in many areas: the US tech giants often enjoy monopolistic power with a few alternatives, apart from Chinese providers. This dependency is a potential EU weakness, especially when it comes to critical digital infrastructure such as cloud services and satellites. European attempts to break these US monopolies and compete in digital services continue to be significant sources of friction in transatlantic relations, resulting in US threats of trade restrictions as a response to the enforcement of EU digital regulations. The EU should, therefore, prioritise reducing its reliance on US digital infrastructure and finding the most effective responses to US threats. As with critical raw materials dependencies, reducing dependencies linked to US digital or financial dominance requires a medium- to long-term strategy and a combination of different EU tools.
See, e.g. Fabry E. “Over-dependencies in services: A blind spot in the EU economic security strategy?”. – European Policy Centre’s “Turning the Tide: Towards Open Economic Security -Ten Reflections”, (2025); in: https://epc-web-s3.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/ckeditor/2025/06/04/compendium-final.pdf
Semiconductor sector could be an example: the EU does not control the fabrication of semiconductors; but, ASML in the Netherlands, has a monopoly on the machines used for their production. This means the EU cannot be easily excluded from semiconductor value chains; allowing other states in “developing monopoly powers” in critical technologies would make it difficult for the EU-27 to compete.
Political economy and governance in economic security
The implementation of economic-security strategies raises a governance challenge. At EU level, there is a need to coordinate deployment of the various economic-security tools, for which different parts of the Commission are responsible, and to ensure a robust framework for sharing information and for the coordination of EU and member-state instruments. At international level, the relationship between WTO rules and economic security measures, and whether a new institutional framework is needed to coordinate economic security policies, must be clarified.
The creation of the role of European commissioner responsible for economic security was an important step towards better coordination of the work being done in the Commission, both on risk assessment and on ensuring synergy and coherence in the deployment of the different economic-security tools. This would imply a reinforcement of cooperation between the relevant Commission services, with a coordinating role for the trade directorate-general. At the political level, the Commissioners’ Project Group on Economic Security could manage risk-mitigation strategies and arbitrate in cases of potential conflicts between services.
The WTO does not presently provide a forum in which economic-security policies can be discussed; there are also questions about whether the WTO dispute-settlement mechanism is the most appropriate tool to address conflicts arising from the implementation of economic-security measures. The WTO framework could, however, be critical role in preventing tit-for-tat escalation by ensuring that any response to measures based on essential security concerns remains proportionate. For instance, instead of reviewing the legal justification for export controls on dual-use technologies, an arbitration panel could establish the economic impact of the measures and review the proportionality of possible responses. All of these issues could be part of the discussion on WTO reform.
Beyond WTO, the G7 has been important in economic security’s discussions; however, it is unlikely that the Trump administration would be ready to enter into a genuine process of consultation on economic-security policies and measures. When the US might try to coerce other G7 members, it is difficult to see how meaningful discussions in the “G7 anti-coercion forums” would be. Nevertheless, there are options for cooperation on policies aimed at de-risking import dependencies in certain priority areas, such as critical raw materials.
Thus, e.g. medium-term risk-mitigation strategies need to be developed for priority economic security risks, particularly related to dependencies on critical raw materials and digital and financial infrastructures. The Anti-Coercion Instrument should be made ready for deployment in case threats related to digital regulation or export controls on critical raw materials are used as a coercive instrument.
Source and citations from: https://www.bruegel.org/policy-brief/strategy-doctrine-next-steps-european-economic-security
The US essential strategic interests
New US National Security Strategy (NSS) adopted in November 2025, managed on 33 pages to reveal the country’s national interests and priorities: e.g. in Europe. A “strategy”, as the document notes, “is a concrete and realistic plan” explaining the “essential connections between ends and means”: i.e. from an “accurate assessment of what is desired, what tools are available, or can realistically be created, to achieve the desired outcomes”.
On less than two pages (pp.25-27), the US NSS “uncovers” national essential interests concerning the “continental Europe” (the UK excluded); and the EU’s assessment is mildly said quire grim: “Europe has been losing share of global GDP -down from 25 percent in 1990 to 14 percent today -partly owing to national and transnational regulations that undermine creativity and industriousness”, the strategy notes. Hence, the US wants “the EU to remain European, to regain its civilizational self-confidence and to abandon its failed focus on regulatory suffocation”. The US suggests the following “broad policy’s” priorities for Europe; we think it is well worth to make a complete copy of these suggestions:
= Reestablishing conditions of stability within Europe and strategic stability with Russia;
= Enabling Europe to stand on its own feet and operate as a group of aligned sovereign nations, including by taking primary responsibility for its own defense, without being dominated by any adversarial power;
= Cultivating resistance to Europe’s current trajectory within European nations;
= Opening European markets to U.S. goods and services and ensuring fair treatment of U.S. workers and businesses;
= Building up the healthy nations of Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe through commercial ties, weapons sales, political collaboration, and cultural and educational exchanges;
= Ending the perception, and preventing the reality, of NATO as a perpetually
expanding alliance; and
= Encouraging Europe to take action to combat mercantilist overcapacity, technological theft, cyber espionage, and other hostile economic practices.
Source and citations from the NSS in: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf
The prominent US “Foreign Affairs”, has commented recently (8 December 2025), that “rather than calibrated persuasion” within the EU member states’ structure, the US strategy advocates “promoting conservatism in Europe”; i.e. it recommends “cultivating resistance to Europe’s current trajectory within European nations,” a trajectory that inclines toward liberal internationalism and/or toward “liberal EU-wide transnationalism”. Therefore, “altering Europe’s political trajectory is a radical political project for the US”; but “accomplishing it would require the sustained application of American power overseas”.
Besides, the US strategy approaches the EU as “a second-order consideration”; i.e. attitudes on other global regions -mainly in the Indo-Pacific part- precede that of the Western Hemisphere. Hence, the strategy “establishes freedom of navigation and regional stability as priorities in the Indo-Pacific, positioning China as a competitor while underscoring the importance of avoiding direct conflict with a nuclear power that is a military behemoth”. Therefore, the Indo-Pacific “will continue to be among the next century’s key economic and geopolitical battlegrounds”; and the “geo-economic might of the Indo-Pacific makes it a place of infinite opportunity” for the modern US administration.
Source and citation from: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/trumps-power-paradox